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NOTES
THE ESTATE TAX STATUS OF MICHIGAN
"NO-FAULT" SURVIVORS' LOSS BENEFITS
INTRODUCTION
Life insurance is an asset owned by the majority of American
citizens, and the life insurance industry holds huge dollar reserves
nationwide.' The popularity of life insurance ownership is at-
tributable in part to the estate planning flexibility that life in-
surance provides.' To capitalize upon the popularity of life insurance
as an estate planning tool, insurance companies actively compete for
tax-conscious buyers with life insurance plans which promise to pro-
vide estate tax savings. The Treasury Department has responded by
continuously scrutinizing the taxation of policy proceeds. The
resulting friction between the taxpayer, the insurance industry, and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has given rise to a steady
stream of tax litigation. As a result, Congress is presented with a
continuing problem of taxing life insurance in the most propitious
manner for all concerned.
The implementation of no-fault auto insurance in Michigan3 has
introduced a new and unique life insurance taxation problem to Con-
gress and to the courts. Recently, the IRS has taken the position
that Michigan no-fault survivors' loss coverage constitutes a policy
on the life of the insured for estate tax purposes.' According to the
1. At the close of calendar year 1975, there were $2,140 billion of life in-
surance, face value, in force in the United States, covering 145 million lives. INSTITUTE
OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 9 (1976). See also Groll, Life In-
surance: Incidents of Ownership and Economic Benefit, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 339 (1967).
2. See generally CREEDON, SOME USES OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ESTATE PLAN-
NING (1974); CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING ch. VIII (3d ed. 1961).
3. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 1977).
4. Letter from the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service, Detroit,
Michigan, to the Executrix of the Estate of Anonymous, form L-191A (Rev. 4-74)
December 17, 1976.
Mr. Anonymous, an insured driver under Michigan law, met his death in an
automobile accident on October 14, 1974. The decedent carried a standard "no-fault"
automobile insurance policy with the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company which pro-
vided, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Company will pay, in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Michigan In-
surance Code, to or on behalf of each eligible injured person, or his depen-
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IRS, death benefits paid to surviving dependents of the insured
under the auspices of the statute should be subject to estate taxa-
tion as life insurance proceeds.
The wisdom of the IRS position appears dubious in light of the
historical development and application of the estate tax laws concer-
ning life insurance and wrongful death. As will be seen, Michigan
survivors' loss benefits do not fall within the concept of taxable life
insurance proceeds as developed by Congress and the courts. Fur-
thermore, the benefits represent a non-taxable award closely akin to
recovery for wrongful death. Although excluding survivors' loss
benefits from the taxable estates of deceased taxpayers may reduce
total revenues collected by the Treasury Department, it would not
create a significant disruption of the national estate tax scheme.
The purpose of this note is to survey the federal law on estate
taxation of life insurance and determine whether or not Michigan
"no-fault" survivors' loss benefits should be taxed as proceeds of a
life insurance policy. The examination will analyze the relationship
between wrongful death recovery and survivors' loss insurance in
Michigan, and discuss the inconsistency of a Treasury Department
policy that would tax survivors' loss benefits while wrongful death
recovery remains a tax-exempt award. Also, the tax code criteria for
taxing life insurance proceeds will be investigated; demonstrating
that survivors' loss benefits should not be treated as taxable pro-
ceeds under the code. Before the tax status of survivors' loss in-
surance can be ascertained, however, it is necessary to become
dent survivors, personal protection benefits consisting of ... (c) survivors'
loss as a result of bodily injury caused by accident and arising out of the
ownership, operation, maintenance or use . . . of a motor vehicle as a
motor vehicle.
Under the terms of the policy the decedent's widow received $1000 per month from
the date of the accident as survivors' loss benefits. The payments were reduced by
Michigan workman's compensation benefits and federal Social Security benefits re-
ceived by the children of the decedent, as required by the no-fault statute:
Benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of any state
or of the federal government shall be subtracted from the personal pro-
tection insurance benefits otherwise payable for the injury.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3109 (Supp. 1977). The reduced payments would con-
tinue until the decedent's wife received the $36,000 maximum survivors' loss award.
As executrix of the decedent's estate, the decedent's wife.filed an estate tax
return with the IRS. Upon review of that return, the IRS examining agent proposed
an increase in the decedent's gross estate of $36,000. The agent maintained that sur-
vivors' loss benefits represent taxable life insurance proceeds under section 2042 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Consequently, a tax increase in excess of $5,000
was charged to the decedent's estate. At this writing, the IRS determination of defi-
ciency is under official protest by the wife of the decedent.
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familiar with the provisions of the Michigan no-fault automobile in-
surance law.
THE MICHIGAN No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW
In 1972 the State of Michigan revised its insurance code to pro-
vide for no-fault automobile insurance.' The law was passed to per-
mit expeditious compensation of motor vehicle accident victims for a
certain portion of their economic loss and medical expenses without
regard for fault.' The law also preempts certain tort actions that
were available to accident victims prior to passage of the no-fault
act and limits the nature and measure of damages recoverable in the
actions which remain available.!
5. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 1977). The act applies to
all motor vehicle accidents occurring on or after October 1, 1973. Id § 500.3179.
Passage of the act made Michigan the 19th state to adopt some form of no-fault
statute. See Forkosch, Torts: Annual Survey, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 647, 647 n.2 (1974).
For a comparative analysis of the various no-fault statutes see M. WOODROOF, J.
FONSECA & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-FAULT LAW (1974).
6. Personal protection insurance and property protection insurance are
specifically provided without regard for fault. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3105(2),
.3121(2). Personal protection benefits are due within 30 days after the insurer receives
proof of the accident and of the amount of the loss sustained. Id § 500.3142.
7. The no-fault act abolishes all common law tort liability arising from the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle except for three specific instances.
Liability still exists for intentional torts to person or property. Id §§ 500.3105(4),
.3135(2)(a). However, the statute modifies the common law definition of "intent"
through incorporation of the common law privileges of self-defense and defense of
others. A person does not intentionally cause injury under the statute if he acts or
refrains from action for the purpose of avoiding injury to any person, including
himself, or to tangible property.
Tort liability is also retained for non-economic loss (pain and suffering, loss of
companionship) when the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of
body function or permanent serious disfigurement. Id. § 500.3135(1). "Non-economic
loss" and "serious impairment of body function" are not defined by the statute. It has
been suggested that "the vagueness and potential breadth of the Michigan language will
invite litigation over the meaning of the terms themselves, and appears destined to
spawn a large volume of actions on the merits." Forkosch, TORTS: ANNUAL SURVEY, 20
WAYNE L. REV. 647, 659 (1974).
Finally, tort liability is preserved for economic losses in excess of the monthly
limitations placed on no-fault recovery for work loss and survivors' loss. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.3135(2)(c).
If a no-fault claimant recovers in tort for accidental bodily injury after he has
received no-fault personal protection benefits "based on" the same injury, the claimant
must reimburse the insurer out of his tort recovery a sum equal to the insurance
benefits previously received. Id. § 500.3116. The utility of this provision is uncertain.
Personal protection benefits are paid for economic loss only. Under § 500.3135, tort ac-
tions are maintainable only for non-economic loss, intentional torts, and economic loss
above the no-fault statutory maximum. Accordingly, it is impossible to construct a
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The cost of the program is distributed among all motor vehicle
owners, each of whom must by law maintain a no-fault policy on his
vehicle.' Benefits are received by the insured from his own in-
surance company, thus replacing the three-party tort liability
scheme with a two-party compensation system.' Operation of an
uninsured motor vehicle subjects the owner or operator to revoca-
tion of his driver's license as well as to other misdemeanor
penalties.'0
The statute provides three types of insurance coverage: per-
sonal protection," property protection," and residual liability, 3 each
providing its own special benefits. Personal protection insurance,
the subject of present concern, compensates for accidental bodily in-
jury occurring anywhere in the United States and Canada and aris-
ing out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle.' Personal protection coverage pays for "all reasonable
charges" for the injured person's "care, recovery or rehabilitation"
and funeral expenses of up to $1000.15 Compensation is also provided
for loss of employment income, payable for the first three years
after the accident up to a maximum of $1000 per month." The work-
loss figure also includes up to $20 a day to obtain personal services
hypothetical in which tort recovery for negligent injury and personal protection
recovery would compensate for the same injury, unless § 500.3116 would reimburse
economic loss insurers with the funds from non-economic tort recovery. That such a
result was intended by the Michigan legislature is doubtful.
8. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3101 (Supp. 1977).
9. Provision is also made for the vehicle owner to post security and be a self-
insurer. Id § 500.3101(4). Pedestrians involved in motor vehicle accidents are protected
by an "assigned claims" provision of the statute. Id §§ 500.3171-.3176.
10. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3102 (Supp. 1977).
11. Id. §§ 500.3105-.3115.
12. Id. §§ 500.3121-.3127. Coverage of up to $1,000,000 per accident is provided
for loss of the use of tangible property through physical injury or destruction "arising
out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle .. " Id. §
500.3121(1), (2), (3). The amount recoverable is the lesser of repair or replacement, less
depreciation, plus the value of the loss of the property's use. Id. § 500.3121(5). Collision
insurance and vehicle contents coverage is excluded. Id. § 500.3123(1)(a).
13. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3131 (Supp. 1977). Residual liability in-
surance provides Michigan drivers with whatever coverage is required by the foreign
jurisdictions they may enter. Within Michigan the residual clause provides liability in-
surance against the tort actions retained in § 500.3135.
14. Id. § 500.3105.
15. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(a) (Supp. 1977).
The "reasonable charges" requirement allows for practically unlimited medical
coverage. If the cost can be justified in medical records, it will probably be allowed.
See MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 500.3157 & .3158(2). This characteristic of the Michigan
no-fault plan distinguishes it from the plans of many other states.
16. Id. § 500.3107(b).
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that the insured would have rendered to himself or his dependents
had the accident not occurred. 7 Benefits are not paid to the in-
jured's estate for any loss of work or services after the date on
which the injured person dies.'"
If an accident results in the death of the insured, personal pro-
tection "survivors' loss benefits" are payable directly to the
dependents of the deceased policyholder. 9 Survivors' loss includes
compensation for lost services of the deceased of up to $20 per day,
plus "contributions of tangible things of economic value, not in-
cluding services, that dependents of the deceased at the time of his
death would have received for support .. ."0 As in the case of non-
fatal injury, survivors' loss benefits may not exceed a maximum pay-
ment of $1000 per month and are not payable beyond the first three
years after the date of the accident." Determination of dependency
is made according to provisions of the statute," and payments are
made directly to surviving dependents after they apply for benefits
with the deceased's insurer."
SURVIVORS' Loss BENEFITS AND WRONGFUL DEATH
The Michigan no-fault plan will continue to serve the public with
full force and effect only if the IRS is made aware of the true nature of
survivors' loss benefits. Any attempt to tax survivors' loss as life in-
surance ignores the fact that survivors' loss coverage represents a
legislative extension of the Michigan wrongful death scheme. As a
de facto statutory embodiment of what was once recovery for
wrongful death, survivors' loss benefits should be subject to the
same tax exclusion that governs amounts received under a wrongful
death judgmtnt.
Estate Taxation and Wrongful Death: The Rule of Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States
Since survivors' loss benefits represent a part of the damage
amount that would be otherwise recovered in wrongful death, they
should be excluded from the estate of the insured for the same
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 500.3108.
20. Id.
21. Id. To insure that all losses are accounted for, benefits are paid as the loss
accrues. Id. § 500.3142(1). The right to future benefits is not assignable. Id. § 500.3143.
*22. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3110 (Supp. 1977).
23. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3141-.3142 (Supp. 1977).
1977]
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reasons that wrongful death proceeds are excluded. In Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States," the Second Circuit held that
the pre-trial settlement proceeds under a Connecticut wrongful
death action were not includable in the estate of the deceased tax-
payer under section 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code, 25 which in-
cludes in the estate of the decedent all interests in property held by
him at death. The court in Connecticut Bank found that the Con-
necticut wrongful death act created an action which arises after the
death of the deceased, and hence recovery under the act was not to
be considered taxable under § 2033.'
The Treasury Department elected not to lobby for a congres-
sional rewording of the tax code that would overturn the Connec-
ticut Bank rule and include wrongful death proceeds in the section
2033 definition of property held at death. Instead, the Department
acquiesced in the rule that tort damages paid as compensation for
premature death are not includable in the decedent's gross estate. 8
The Treasury's decision is politically in tune with public opinion con-
cerning estate taxation. Historically, the Anglo-American taxation of
estates has drawn its strength from several public policy concerns: a
puritanical abhorrance of idleness, thought to be the child of un-
earned wealth; a belief that the economic well-being of society re-
quires that all of its members earn their own livings; and a
democratic insistence upon equality of opportunity." It is doubtful,
however, that the majority of Americans would favor extending
those egalitarian principles to the tragedy of wrongful death. It
follows that Congress would not enthusiastically embrace a pro-
posed change in the tax code that promised to offend the emotional
sensibilities of taxpaying voters.
Both the Michigan' and Connecticut"' wrongful death acts
operate on the principle that the action arises after and because of
death and can only be brought by a representative of the deceased's
24. 465 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1972). See Comment, Federal Estate Taxation of
Wrongful Death Proceeds, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 445 (1973).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
26. For the purposes of the section, "Property" has been interpreted to in-
clude tort actions held by the decedent at the time of his death. See Rev. Rul. 69-8,
1969-1 CUM. BULL. 219.
27. 465 F.2d at 763-64.
28. Rev. Rul. 75-127, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 297.
29. BITTKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 984-85
(4th ed. 1972).
30. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (Supp. 1977).
31. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-555 (Supp. 1969).
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estate for the benefit of dependent survivors. Therefore the Connec-
ticut Bank result should apply to damages recovered under the
Michigan Wrongful Death Act.32 It follows that if survivors' loss
benefits represent a portion of the possible recovery in wrongful
death, then they should likewise be excluded from federal taxation
under the Connecticut Bank rule.
The Working Relationship Between Survivors' Loss and Recovery
in Wrongful Death
While an action for wrongful death33 remains possible in
Michigan notwithstanding the no-fault insurance law,' the no-fault
32. The Treasury Department's own revenue rulings are supportive of this
position. See Rev. Rul. 75-127, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 297 (proceeds paid under a "survival"
type wrongful death statute of any state will not be included in the decedent's gross
estate); Rev. Rul. 75-126, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 296 (damages recovered under the Arizona
wrongful death statute are not included in the decedent's gross estate); Rev. Rul. 69-8,
1969-1 CUM. BULL. 219 (damages recovered for wrongful death under the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act are not includible in the decedent's gross estate); Rev.
Rul. 54-19, 1954-1. CUM. BULL. 179 (proceeds of a settlement under the New Jersey
wrongful death act, very similar to the Michigan act, are not includible in the
decedent's gross estate).
33. The Michigan Wrongful Death Act reads as follows:
(1) Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death
shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or
default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages, in respect thereof,
then and in every such case, the persons who, or the corporation which
would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an ac-
tion for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount in law to felony. All actions for such death, or injuries resulting in
death, shall be brought only under this section.
(2) Every such action shall be brought by, and in the names of,
the personal representatives of such deceased person, and in every such
action the court or jury may give such damages, as, the court or jury,
shall deem fair and just, under all of the circumstances to those persons
who may be entitled to such damages when recovered including damages
for the reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which
the estate is liable and reasonable compensation for the pain and suffer-
ing, while conscious, undergone by such deceased person during the
period intervening between the time of the inflicting of such injuries and
his death. The amount of damages recoverable by civil action for death
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or fault of another may also include
recovery for the loss of the society and companionship of the deceased.
Such person or persons entitled to such damages shall be of that class
who, by law, would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the
deceased had he died intestate. The amount recovered in every such ac-
tion shall be distributed to the surviving spouse and next of kin who suf-
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act modifies wrongful death recovery to a substantial degree. In
Michigan there exist four basic elements of damage for wrongful
death: medical and funeral costs to the decedent's estate, conscious
pain and suffering of the decedent before death, and loss of the
decedent's companionship by his next of kin.35 The no-fault law per-
fered injury and in proportion thereto. Within 30 days after the entry of
such judgment, the judge before whom such case was tried or his suc-
cessor shall certify to the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate
of such deceased person the amount and date of entry thereof, and shall
advise the probate court by written opinion as to the amount thereof
representing the loss suffered by the surviving spouse and all of the next
of kin, and the proportion of such total loss suffered by the surviving
spouse and each of the next of kin of such deceased person, as shown by
the evidence. After providing for the payment of the reasonable medical,
hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is liable, the
probate court shall determine as provided by law the manner in which the
amount representing the total loss suffered by the surviving spouse and
next of kin shall be distributed, and the proportionate share thereof to be
distributed to the surviving spouse and next of kin. The remainder of the
proceeds of such judgment shall be distributed according to the intestate
laws.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (Supp. 1977).
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 1977).
35. In early Michigan, as in other common law jurisdictions, there was no civil
cause of action for the death of a human being caused by the wrongful act or
negligence of another. Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 184-85 (1867). Nor did Michigan
common law permit the survival of actions for personal injury. Dolson v. Lake Shore &
Mich. So. Ry., 128 Mich. 444, 452, 87 N.W. 629, 632 (1901). However, as early as 1838,
the legislature provided for survival of actions by statute; by 1885 an action for
"negligent injuries to the person" was included among those actions expressly surviv-
ing. See, e.g., 3 Comp. Laws 1915 § 12383; 2 Comp. Laws 1871 § 6724. Then in 1848 the
first wrongful death act, a typical "Lord Campbell's Act," was passed in Michigan. See
e.g., 3 Comp. Laws 1929 § 14061; Comp. Laws 1897 § 10427. See also In Re Onley's
Est., 309 Mich. 65, 73, 14 N.W.2d 574, 577 (1944); Dolson v. Lake Shore & Mich. So.
Ry., 128 Mich. 444, 448-63, 87 N.W. 629, 630-36 (1901).
Under the early statutes, the distinction between a survival action and a
wrongful death action turned on the time of death of the injured party. See Estate of
Stewart v. Armstrong, 384 Mich. 709, 713, 187 N.W.2d 223, 224-25 (1971); In Re Onley's
Est., 309 Mich. 65, 74, 14 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1944). Theoretically, the Wrongful Death
Act provided a statutory action for pecuniary injury caused to those persons having a
beneficial interest in the decedent's life, while the Survival Act preserved to the
decedent's estate the claims which he held at the time of his death for injuries to his
person or property, including conscious pain and suffering. Instantaneous death re-
quired an action for wrongful death, and a lingering death meant that recovery would
come under a survival action. See Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Sur-
vival Statutes, 23 MICH. L. REV. 114 (1925).
As both actions were "dependent on the [same] injury," Lincoln v. Detroit &
Mackinac Ry, 179 Mich. 189, 196, 146 N.W. 405, 407 (1914), the legislature incorporated
the two statutes into a single wrongful death law in 1939. The 1939 law enabled the in-
jured person's representative to bring an action regardless of whether there was in-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 6
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mits an independent wrongful death action for pain and suffering
and loss of companionship. Recovery for such injuries is in no way
stantaneous death or survival of the injured person, and specified to whom damages
should be distributed. Grimes v. King, 311 Mich. 399, 414, 18 N.W.2d 870, 873 (1945).
The current act provides an action for damages whenever, if death had not ensued,
there would have been an action for damages by the person injured. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(1) (Supp. 1977). See O'Neil v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 133, 188
N.W.2d 785, 786 (1971). The action arises solely on the date and because of the
wrongfully injured decedent's death. See Estate of Stewart v. Armstrong, 384 Mich.
709, 714, 187 N.W.2d 223, 225 (1971). Since 1939 the Wrongful Death Act has stipulated
that all actions for death, or actions pending at death, must be brought under that
statte. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(1) (Supp. 1977). See also MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. § 600.2921.
It is the special duty of the personal representative to show that the deceased
could have maintained an action in tort if death had not ensued. See Maiuri v. Sinacola
Const. Co., 382 Mich. 391, 396, 170 N.W.2d 27, 30 (1969); Hoag v. Paul C. Chapman &
Sons, Inc., 62 Mich. App. 290, 296, 233 N.W.2d 530, 533 (1975). At no time can surviv-
ing dependents bring an ancillary action to recover in an individual capacity. See
Burns v. VanLaan, 367 Mich. 485, 116 N.W.2d 873 (1962); Westfall v. Venton, 1 Mich.
App. 612, 137 N.W.2d 757, 762 (1965).
The Death Act provides that "the court or jury may give such damages as
[they] shall deem fair and just, under all of the circumstances to those persons who
may be entitled to such damages .. " MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(2) (Supp.
1977). Such damages include reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses
for which the estate is liable. Also included is compensation for loss of economic sup-
port and rendition of services to eligible survivors who were partially or wholly depen-
dent upon the deceased. See Mooney v. Hill, 367 Mich. 138, 116 N.W.2d 231 (1962);
Rytkonen v. City of Wakefield, 364 Mich. 86, 94-5, 111 N.W.2d 63, 67 (1961); Mac-
Donald v. Quimby, 350 Mich. 21, 85 N.W.2d 157 (1957); Judis v. Borg-Warner Corp., 339
Mich. 313, 326, 63 N.W.2d 647, 649-50 (1954); Westfall v. Venton, 1 Mich. App. 612,
621-22, 137 N.W.2d 757, 759 (1965). Loss of a deceased child's services is recoverable by
the parents. Rohm v. Stroud, 386 Mich. 693, 194 N.W.2d 307 (1972); Thompson v.
Ogeman County Bd. of Rd. Comm'rs., 357 Mich. 482, 98 N.W.2d 620 (1959). Conscious
pain and suffering by the deceased before death is recoverable, Baker v. Slack, 319
Mich. 703, 707, 30 N.W.2d 403, 405 (1948); as is loss of his society and companionship to
the survivors. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2922(2) (Supp. 1977). Loss of companion-
ship became a recoverable item only after considerable vacillation by the courts, and a
specific amendment to that effect in 1971. Id. See Smith v. City of Detroit, 388 Mich.
637, 646 n.5, 202 N.W.2d 300, 305 n.5 (1972); Bradfield v. Estate of Burgess, 62 Mich.
App. 345, 350-52, 233 N.W.2d 541, 543-44 (1975). See also Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co.,
383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970) (loss of companionship not recoverable), over-
ruled, 388 Mich. 637, 202 N.W.2d 300 (1972); Burns v. VanLaan, 367 Mich. 485, 116
N.W.2d 873 (1962) (loss of companionship not recoverable); Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361
Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960) (loss of companionship recoverable); Swarthout v.
Beard, 33 Mich. App. 395, 190 N.W.2d 373 (1971) (loss of companionship not
recoverable); Westfall v. Venton, 1 Mich. App. 612, 137 N.W.2d 757 (1965) (loss of com-
panionship recoverable). If the tortfeasor should happen to die before the death of the
injured victim, wrongful death liability will affix to the wrongdoer's estate. See In Re
Muller's Estate, 28 Mich. 203, 211-15, 273 N.W. 448 (1937) (Butzel, J. dissenting). But
see In Re Onley's Estate, 309 Mich. 65, 79-80, 14 N.W.2d 574, 581 (1974).
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reduced by recovery pursuant to the no-fault act." The no-fault
statute does not permit wrongful death recovery for medical and
funeral expenses, or for loss of support and services from the dece-
dent, unless such recovery is for amounts over and above the
$36,000 maximum benefit paid pursuant to the no-fault personal pro-
tection insurance provisions." Because of this limitation, it is com-
mon practice in Michigan, when negotiating a wrongful death settle-
ment, to reduce the settlement by amounts received as survivors'
loss benefits.
It is therefore apparent that survivors' loss is a partial
substitute for recovery in wrongful death for the loss of economic
support and services provided by the deceased to his next of kin.
With the implementation of survivors' loss coverage, Michigan has
swept away the necessity of pursuing the first $36,000 of an
automobile accident-wrongful death claim in court.
It is logical that the no-fault law should fill such a role. The
theory of no-fault is that the injured party looks to his own insurer
for assistance and is thereby able to resolve the financial complica-
tions of his accident without protracted legal dispute.' If the in-
sured is killed, his surviving dependents have an immediate need for
replacement of his earning power. The survivors' loss provision pro-
vides such relief without substantial delay and therefore acts to
defray the hardship of an unexpected death. Bolstered by a speedy
survivors' loss award, the dependents of the deceased are in a bet-
ter position financially to pursue lengthy wrongful death litigation
for amounts in excess of the survivors' loss allowance. As a
legislatively administered portion of wrongful death recovery,
Michigan survivors' loss benefits should be excluded from the estate
taxation under the Connecticut Bank rule.
Persons entitled to recover damages under the Wrongful Death Act must
belong to the class of persons who, by law, would be entitled to inherit the personal
property of the deceased had he died intestate. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(2)
(Supp. 1977). Within 30 days after judgment, the trial judge must certify to the pro-
bate court the amount of his judgment. Id. A written opinion must attach advising the
probate court what proportion of the judgment goes to each eligible taker as shown by
the evidence. Id See also Hix v. Besser Co., 386 Mich. 499, 194 N.W.2d 333 (1972).
After providing for the payment of reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial ex-
penses for which the estate is liable, the probate court determines and supervises the
distribution of damages to eligible takers as provided for by the probate and intestate
laws. Id.
36. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3135, .3116. (Supp. 1977). See also note
7 supra
37. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135(2)(c) (Supp. 1977).
38. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 568 (4th ed. 1971).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss3/6
NO-FA ULT INSURANCE
The IRS could argue that differences exist between survivors'
loss and wrongful death which distinguish the application of Connec-
ticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States39 to survivors' loss cases.
Unlike an action for wrongful death, no showing of liability is need-
ed to recover under the survivors' loss statute." If the eligible sur-
vivors can show dependency as required by statute,4 1 they receive
benefits. This is true even if the insured was partly responsible for
the accident causing his death. In that regard survivors' loss
benefits are a vested expectancy, resembling life insurance much
more than they resemble potential recovery in tort. But if the
Treasury takes the position that survivors' loss insurance is not a
statutory embodiment of wrongful death recovery, the Department
will probably run afoul of the same public indignation that encourag-
ed the IRS to acquiesce to the Connecticut Bank rule originally. Sur-
vivors' loss benefits do not provide the recipient with a lucrative
windfall, but only with a modest living allowance. However, even if
the courts eventually determine that survivors' loss benefits are not
deserving of wrongful death estate tax exclusion, the benefits would
still fail to qualify as taxable life insurance proceeds under the tax
code.
APPLICATION OF SECTION 2042 TO SURVIVORS' Loss INSURANCE
If survivors' loss benefits were not viewed as a tax-exempt
award under the rule of Connecticut Bank & Trust,'2 the benefits
would still qualify as nontaxable insurance proceeds under the
criteria of § 2042." An insured must possess powers of control over
the policy on his life that vest him with economic benefits before the
policy proceeds will be subject to estate taxation. A Michigan driver
holds no economically beneficial powers of control- "incidents of
ownership"- in the survivors' loss portion of his no-fault insurance
contract. Therefore, survivors' loss benefits should not be subject to
§ 2042 taxation as proceeds from a policy on the life of the insured.
Survivors' Loss Coverage as Life Insurance
Generally, the layperson views life insurance as something pur-
chased by the insured for the purpose of providing a fund of money
to pass at his death to his favored dependents. Unfortunately, the
39. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
40. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3105(2), .3121(2) (Supp. 1977).
41. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3110 (Supp. 1977).
42. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
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tax authorities have not been overly zealous in their efforts to pro-
vide a more exact definition of life insurance for the purposes of sec-
tion 2042." The applicable regulation simply states: "The term 'in-
surance' refers to life insurance of every description, including death
benefits paid by fraternal beneficial societies operating under the
lodge system."45 However, the substance of court dicta on the sub-
ject shows that for an insurance policy to exist for the purposes of §
2042, someone-usually the insured-is making payments in settle-
ment of a contract that exposes the underwriters to a risk of finan-
cial loss if the insured dies. As Justice Murphy explained in Helver-
ing v. LeGierse:"
[For a life insurance policy to exist] amounts must be
received as the result of a transaction which involved an
actual "insurance risk" at the time the transaction was ex-
ecuted. Historically and commonly insurance involves risk-
shifting and risk-distributing. . . .That these elements of
risk-shifting and risk-distributing are essential to a life in-
surance contract is agreed by courts and commentators. 7
The severity of the "insurance risk" carried by the policy under-
writer usually determines the cost of the insurance contract. The
policy premiums are determined on the basis of the ratio of the
premiums paid to the probability of the occurrence of the risk in-
sured against-the death of the insured. But, for an insurance risk
to exist, the insurer need not assume the full impact of the risk in a
solitary calculated gamble. The insurer usually mitigates its poten-
tial loss by spreading the risk over a diverse number of policy
holders. 8
The Treasury Regulations take the position that life insurance
ceases to be a taxable item when the reserve value under the policy
equals the death benefit, because there is no longer an insurance
44. Groll, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Life Insurance, 15 DEPAUL L. REV.
48, 72-74 (1965).
45. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(1) (1975).
46. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
47. Id. at 539. See also Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687, 690 (1945);
Keller v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 543 (1941); Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d
288, 290 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950); Seward's Estate v. Commissioner,
164 F.2d 434, 437 (4th Cir. 1947); Helvering v. Tyler, 111 F.2d 422, 426 (8th Cir. 1940),
aff'd, 312 U.S. 651 (1941); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 380, 382 (1st
Cir. 1941).
48. See Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 853 (1950).
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risk under the contract.49 There is no proration under this rule; it is
an all-or-nothing proposition. For example, imagine that the insured
buys a $36,000 endowment policy on his life. When the policy
reserve reaches $36,000 it ceases to be insurance for estate tax pur-
poses. If, however, the reserve value amounted to only $25,000, the
entire policy would be regarded as taxable insurance, not merely
1/36 of the policy; the proportion by which the face value exceeded
the reserve. As long as there is some risk of financial loss to the
underwriter under the terms of the policy, no matter how small, the
entire policy amount is regarded as life insurance for estate tax pur-
poses.'
The case of Commissioner v. Noel's Estate"1 put to rest the
idea that for the purposes of section 2042 "life insurance" status
depends upon the technical label affixed to the policy by the insurer.
In Noel the insured purchased a flight insurance policy shortly
before boarding a flight which ultimately ended in a fatal crash. He
named his wife as beneficiary and left the policy in her safekeeping.
Relying on the earlier case of Ackerman v. Commissioner,52 the
Supreme Court found no difference for estate tax purposes between
life insurance and the flight insurance policy purchased by Noel. The
fact that Noel's accidental death was an evitable event did not alter
the fact that his insurer had assumed an insurance risk on his life,
and therefore the proceeds of the policy were included in his gross
estate for tax purposes.
The wording of section 2042 and its corresponding regulation,n
together with the holding in Noel indicate that the term "life in-
surance" should be interpreted to encompass flight insurance, ac-
cidental death insurance, double indemnity provisions and ordinary
life policies, plus term insurance and all variations of those policies."
As will be shown, the term should include Michigan no-fault per-
sonal protection survivors' loss insurance.
49. Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2039-1(d), 20.2042-1(a)(2) (1975). Cf. Provident Trust Co.
v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 74, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
50. See Altschuler v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 456, 459-60 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
51. 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
52. 15 B.T.A. 635 (1929). In Ackerman. the Board of Tax Appeals considered
whether amounts received under accident policies and life policies which provided for
double indemnity in the case of death from accidental means should be included in the
taxable estate of the insured. The board analyzed the distinction between life and acci-
dent insurance, and concluded that for purposes of the application of the federal estate
tax, they were identical.
53. Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2039-1(d), 20.2042-1(a)(2) (1975); Rev. Rul. 62-222, 1965-2
CUM. BULL. 371.
54. See Commissioner v. Noel's Estate, 380 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1965).
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One might be tempted to argue that survivors' loss protection
does not constitute a "policy on the life of the decedent" for the pur-
poses of § 2042 because it differs radically from the layperson's
general concept of life insurance. A life insurance policy normally
provides for the payment of a fixed amount, either in a lump sum or
pursuant to certain annuity elections, contingent solely upon the
death of the insured.' The policy usually represents an actuarial
risk to the insurer as the policy premiums are based upon the life
expectancy of the insured; therefore, the insurer will incur an
economic loss if the insured suffers a "premature" death." Obvious-
ly, these normal components of life insurance are not present in the
Michigan personal protection survivors' loss plan. The survivors'
loss benefit amount is not fixed, except in the maximum.5 7 Payment
of benefits is not solely contingent upon the death of the insured but
is also contingent upon a surviving dependent incurring loss of
economic support due to the insured's death." Finally, the insurance
premium is not based on an actuarial determination of the insured's
life expectancy, but is roughly dependent upon the statistical prob-
ability that the insured will be survived by persons dependent upon
him for support.
Notwithstanding its unusual characteristics, survivors' loss
coverage still represents a contract that exposes the insurer to a
risk of financial loss if the insured dies. The insurer mitigates this
risk by spreading the cost among the class of similarly insured
Michigan drivers." This process of risk-shifting and risk-distributing
draws survivors' loss protection within the Helvering definition of
life insurance" and therefore constitutes a "policy on the life of the
decedent" for the purposes of section 2042." However, it does not
automatically follow that the insured Michigan driver holds any in-
cidents of ownership in his survivors' loss coverage that would make
benefits payable under that section taxable as life insurance pro-
ceeds.
55. See J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2-3 (1965).
56. 1&
57. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 8 & 9 supra and accompanying text.
60. See pp. 486-87 and accompanying notes. See also All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d
633, 636-37 (1963).
As a final argument, survivors' loss benefits could be viewed as a liability pay-
ment by the insurer conditioned upon release of claims for damages by the surviving
dependents to the extent of the payments. As a discharge of liability, the benefits
would not be considered life insurance. See Rev. Rul. 57-54.
61. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
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Development of the Incidents of Ownership Test
If it is conceded that Michigan no-fault survivors' loss in-
surance represents an insurance policy upon the life of the insured,
then the insured must hold some incidents of ownership in his sur-
vivors' loss coverage before the resulting benefits can be taxed. The
incidents of ownership test for the taxation of life insurance pro-
ceeds is a product of many changes in the estate tax law. Tax ex-
perts agree that the estate taxation of life insurance "has been
subject to more vacillation and variation by the Treasury Depart-
ment and Congress than any other asset area."'62 However, the
evolution of the incidents of ownership test can be roughly arranged
into three historical periods.
From 1918 to 1942 the role that incidents of ownership should
play as a taxing criterion for life insurance was unsettled. In 1942 it
was decided that if the insured paid his own life insurance
premiums, he need not hold any incidents of ownership in the policy
for it to be included in his gross estate for tax purposes. The
modern rule, that life insurance proceeds will not be included in the
gross estate of the insured unless he held incidents of ownership in
the policy at death, was adopted by Congress in 1954. Under the
1954 incidents of ownership rule the survivors' loss benefits of a
Michigan no-fault policy should be excluded from the estate of the
deceased for estate tax purposes.
Life insurance proceeds were first subjected to federal estate
taxation by the Revenue Act of 1918." The two current provisions"
62. Groll, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Life Insurance, 15 DEPAuL L. REV. 48
(1965). See also Eliasberg, IRC Section 2042-The Estate Taxation of Life Insurance:
What is an Incident of Ownership?, 51 TAXES 91, 92 (1973). The tax court itself has
labeled the historical metamorphosis of section 2042 "a long and tortuous path, often
marked by confusion and contradiction." Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
1190, 1196 (1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
63. Pub. L. No. 65-244, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (1919).
64. The current estate tax section dealing with life insurance proceeds, §
2042, reads as follows:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR.-To the extent of the
amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent.
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES.-To the ex-
tent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the dece-
dent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable
either along or in conjunction with any other person. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a rever-
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that subject life insurance proceeds to estate taxation originated
with the 1918 Act. The first provision required that insurance pro-
ceeds payable to the estate of the insured be taxed. 5 In the second
provision, Congress required that proceeds payable to beneficiaries
other than the estate of the insured, be taxed to the extent that
such proceeds exceeded $40,000.6 An overriding requirement of both
provisions was that the policy be "taken out by the decedent upon
his own life." 7 Uncertainty arose as to the meaning of that phrase,
and a great deal of tax litigation over its definition followed. 8
In hopes of ending the controversy over the phrase "taken out
by the decedent upon his own life," the Treasury promulgated its
first regulation under the 1918 life insurance provisions. 9 Under the
regulation, policy proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the
estate of the insured were taxable only to the extent that premium
payments had been made by the insured. Payment by the insured
established the policy as insurance taken out by the insured upon
his own life. However, following the Supreme Court decision in
Chase National Bank v. United States,0 the Treasury was forced to
modify its position.
In Chase the Court held that the insured must possess some
"incidents of ownership" in the policy at his death, in addition to
sionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or
other instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such rever-
sionary interest exceeds 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately
before the death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term
"reversionary interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the pro-
ceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be
subject to a power of disposition by him....
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
65. The estate tax treatment of proceeds payable to a decedent's executor has
undergone only slight alteration over the years. LOWNDES, KRAMER & MCCORD,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 13.5 at 328 (3d ed. 1974). Courts have construed
the phrase "receivable by the executor" to include proceeds which are paid to
beneficiaries who are legally bound to use them to discharge obligations to the estate.
BITTKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1224 (4th ed. 1972).
66. This provision was the forerunner of § 2042(2), See note 64 supra.
67. See Pub. L. No. 65-244, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (1919).
68. Most of the confusion and subsequent litigation arose out of cases involv-
ing proceeds payable to other beneficiaries. BITTKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1224 (4th ed. 1972). When the proceeds were payable to
the estate of the insured, the requirement of "taken out by the insured" was usually'
ignored and the proceeds were taxed. LOWNDES, KRAMER & MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES § 13.2 at 322 (3d ed. 1974).
69. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 34 (1919).
70. 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
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paying the policy premiums, for the proceeds to be taxable.7
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Stone explained that a
decedent's possession at death of substantial control over his policy,
such as the right to surrender or cancel the policy for his own
benefit, was necessary for the inclusion of the proceeds in the gross
estate.2
In 1934 the Treasury Department modified its position on the
"payment of premiums" and "incidents of ownership" tests as they
applied to insurance proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than
the insured's estate. The two tests were treated as alternatives. If
the insured possessed any of the incidents of ownership under the
policy, or if he had paid the policy premiums, the policy was con-
sidered to have been taken out by the decedent upon his own life.73
Also, the Department decided that the entire amount of proceeds
would be taxed instead of just a portion of the proceeds equal to the
premium paid before death.7" Eventually, the Treasury regressed
and utilized the premium payments test exclusively in cases of pro-
ceeds paid to other beneficiaries.
7
1
Congress made a major revision of the tax code in 19428 to pro-
vide the public with more precise tax guidelines. The troublesome
phrase "taken out by the decedent upon his own life" was dropped,
and the alternative taxing criterion of 1934, "incidents of owner-
ship" or "payment of premiums," was reinstated for proceeds
payable to beneficiaries other than the estate of the insured. The
$40,000 exception was also deleted.77 The new code also provided
that if the insured had divested himself of all incidents of ownership
in the policy, but continued to pay a percentage of the policy
premiums, then a proportionate share of the policy premiums would
be included in the insured's estate for tax purposes."
With its 1954 revision of the tax code" Congress eliminated the
premiums payment test as a basis for inclusion of the proceeds of a
71. See Treas. Reg. 70, Arts. 25 & 27 (1929).
72. 278 U.S. 327, 335 (1929).
73. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 25 (1934). The relevant text may be found in Schles-
inger, Taxes and Insurance: A Suggested Solution to the Uncertain Cost of Dying, 55
HARV. L. REV. 226, 234 (1941).
74. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 25 (1929).
75. Treas. Reg. 80, as amended, T.D. 5032, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 427.
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 811(g), as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942,
Pub. L. No. 77-753, ch. 619, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 798.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. See note 64 supra.
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life insurance policy in the estate of the insured.' Under the 1954
code, insurance proceeds payable to the estate of the insured are ful-
ly taxable."1  However, for life insurance proceeds payable to
beneficiaries other than the estate of the insured, the sole test for
estate tax includability is whether or not the insured possessed at
his death, exercisable alone or in conjunction with another, 2 any of
the incidents of ownership under the policy.' If the insured
possesses such incidents, the policy proceeds are includable in his
estate regardless of who paid the policy premiums. Conversely, the
insured may maintain the premium payments and not be subject to
the estate tax if he divests himself of all incidents of ownership
under the policy."4 Questions surrounding proceeds payable to the in-
sured's estate are straightforward and have given estate planners
few problems. In contrast, the estate tax status of insurance pro-
ceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the estate hinges upon the
phrase "incidents of ownership."86 The meaning of "incidents of
ownership" is therefore determinative of whether or not Michigan
80. The rationale for abolishing the premiums payment test was outlined in
the Congressional Committee Reports:
No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent initially
purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to the
property, and to discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not
justified.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954).
81. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(1).
82. Originally the 1942 tax code specified that incidents of ownership could be
exercised alone or in conjunction with another person. That change from previous law
caused an expansion of the taxation of life insurance proceeds. Today, taxation occurs
when the insured can change the beneficiary of his policy only upon securing the ap-
proval of the present beneficiary, or when the insured's approval is required before a
change of beneficiary can take place. See Nance v. United States, 430 F.2d 662, 663
(9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v. Estate of Karaghusian, 233 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir.
1956).
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2).
84. Estate planning advisors are quick to point out that life insurance pro-
ceeds which are not taxable under section 2042 may be taxed under some other estate
tax provision. See Berall, Use of Life Insurance in Estate Planning, 31 N.Y.U. INST.
FED. TAX. 1053, 1064 (1973). For example, a transfer of incidents of ownership by the
insured within three years of death will cause the policy proceeds to be included in the
insured's gross estate under section 2035. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. See also
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(2). The same is true for policy premiums paid in contempla-
tion of death. See Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 300; First Nat'l Bank of Midland
v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
85. See Eliasberg, IRC Section 2042-The Estate Taxation of Life Insurance:
What is an Incident of Ownership?, 51 TAXES 91, 92 n.5 (1973).
86. See Groll, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Life Insurance, 15 DEPAUL L.
IEV. 48, 52 (1965).
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no-fault survivors' loss coverage should be subject to the federal
estate tax. As will be shown, a Michigan driver holds no incidents of
ownership in the personal protection survivors' loss portion of his
no-fault policy. Hence, the benefits therefrom should be excluded
from his gross estate for tax purposes.
Application of the Incidents of Ownership Test
Identification of the incidents of ownership in any insurance ar-
rangement, including no-fault survivors' loss coverage, is a com-
plicated task. This is because the tax code does not define "incidents
of ownership" other than to make it clear that it includes a rever-
sionary interest in the policy if the value of the reversionary in-
terest exceeds 5% of the value of the policy before the death of the
insured.17 However, the accompanying regulation88 indicates that the
term is not limited in application to ownership in the technical prop-
erty law sense,89 but includes rights held by the insured that entitle
him to the economic benefits of the policy. Because the regulation is
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2). See Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S.
687 (1945); Helvering v. City Bank Famers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935); Liebman v.
Hassett, 50 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1943); Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617 (Ct.
Cl. 1939).
Community property states may raise interesting reversionary interest prob-
lems in §2042(2) situations. See, e.g., Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir.
1972) (72-2 USTC 12,858), rev'g in part, 329 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (71-2 USTC
12,800). Cf. Corman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 230 (E.D. Mich. 1968). See
generally Thurman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property Life In-
surance, 9 STAN. L. REV. 239 (1957); Note, Federal Estate Taxation of Community
Property Life Insurance, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1150 (1966).
88. The regulation reads as follows:
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of owner-
ship" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the
technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to the
right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy.
Thus, it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or
cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge
the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the
surrender value of the policy, etc. See subparagraph (6) of this paragraph
for rules relating to the circumstances under which incidents of ownership
held by a corporation are attributable to a decedent through his stock
ownership.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1975) (emphasis added).
89. Several factors often considered essential for ownership are not necessary
for section 2042 to apply. For example, the insured need not possess legal and
equitable title in the policy. United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7,
10 (1st Cir. 1966). The insured need not keep possession of the policy either. Fried v.
Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564, 566 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.
1953).
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modeled after the Congressional reports which describe the intend-
ed scope of section 2042," it has been persuasively argued by tax
authorities that those reports indicate that economic benefit was to
be a key ingredient of any incident of ownership:
[Tihe very thrust of the Regulation and the Congressional
Reports indicate[s] that an attempt was made to place the
taxation of life insurance proceeds on a par with the taxa-
tion of other assets; the special provision was tailored to
take cognizance of the difference in the nature of the life
insurance contract only to the extent of including pro-
ceeds where the insured, though not the legal owner of
the policy, did possess the economic benefit of ownership.
Where economic benefit is missing, the proceeds should
go untaxed.1
If a power of control held by the insured over a policy on his own
life does not confer some economic benefit upon him, it is not an in-
cident of ownership for the purposes of the code.2 It follows that if
the insured can realize no economic benefit from an insurance policy
on his own life that will pay proceeds to beneficiaries other than his
estate, then the policy proceeds will not be included in his gross
estate for tax purposes.
A solitary reported case, United States v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co.,93 suggested that incidents of ownership may include
powers of control by the insured which do not provide him with
economic benefit. However, subsequent cases and authorities have
not given determinative weight to that position, and economic
benefit stands strong as a main requisite of the incidents of owner-
ship test.' For example, in Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner" the
Tax Court held that an employee's power to affect the cancellation
90. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954). See also H.R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235
(1942). These reports indicate Congressional intent that economic benefit be a primary
taxing criterion of the incidents.
91. Groll, Life Insurance: Incidents of Ownership and Economic Benefit, 16
DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 351 (1967). See also Estate of Fuchs v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 199,
206 (1966); Wilson Equal Treatment for Life Insurance, 112 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 270
(1973).
92. Groll, Life Insurance: Incidents of Ownership and Economic Benefit, 16
DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 351 (1967).
93. 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
94. See Groll, supra note 92. See also Estate of Fuchs v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 199, 204-06 (1966).
95. 56 T.C. 815 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of an employer-owned policy of insurance on the employee's life by
quitting his job was not an incident of ownership, since such power
of cancellation, if it could realistically be considered as such, did not
comprehend an economic interest of the employee. Neither the
employee nor his estate could gain any economic benefit from
cancellation of his policy.
If a life insurance policy does bestow incidents of ownership on
the insured, he will be deemed to possess them at death regardless
of his intent not to possess or exercise such rights." Also, his
physical inability to exercise such authority will not prevent tax-
ability." It is the power to exercise incidents of ownership, and not
the willingness to exercise them nor physical possession of the
policy, that is determinative of the includability question.
The present regulation gives an illustrative list of rights held
by the insured that should be considered incidents of ownership. 8
The rights mentioned-the power to change the beneficiary, sur-
render, cancel, or assign the policy, revoke an assignment, pledge
the policy for a loan, or obtain from the insurer a loan against the
surrender value of the policy-have uniformly resulted in inclusion
if possessed by the insured at death.9 Possession of any one of the
96. In other words, the policy facts will always predominate over the intent of
the parties, see United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 8, 13 (1st
Cir. 1966), unless the policy facts are the product of an insurance company error. See
Lamade v. Brownell, 245 F. Supp. 691, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 1965) (65-2 USTC 12,353); Na-
tional Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1950 (50-1 USTC
10,747); Estate of Fuchs v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 199 (1966); Estate of Infante, 29 T.C.
Memo. 903 (1970). See generally Yohlin, Ownership and Transfer of Life Insurance, 28
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 765, 767-69 (1970). In determining exactly what the policy facts
are, reference to state law is essential. In Estate of Barlett v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1590 (1970), the Tax Court outlined the role of state law in this regard:
[The Treasury Department's] own regulation requires us to look to the
terms of the policy and to the effect of local law upon the provisions of
the policy. Sec. 20.2042-1(c)(5), Estate Tax Regs. Local Law . . . is common-
ly omitted from the face of the policy. And local law may require that ex-
ternal provisions be added to the policy . . . even though it does not ap-
pear on the face of the policy.
54 T.C. 1590, 1598-99 (1970). Cf. Keefe v. Broderick, 25 F. Supp. 957 (D.R.I. 1939); Col-
umbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 15 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mass. 1936). The federal tax
courts have not always been as diligent as they could be in divining the applicable
state laws. See Misterek, A Role for State Court Adjudication in Federal Tax Cases-
A Proposal, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1968).
97. See Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1965).
98. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1975).
99. Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 333-35 (1929); Nance v.
United States, 430 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1970); Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340
F.2d 829, 833-34 (6th Cir. 1965) (65-1 USTC 12,290); Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d
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enumerated rights will cause the proceeds to be subject to the
estate tax."'
Other less significant powers held by the insured over a life in-
surance policy on his own life may also pull the proceeds into the
gross estate of the insured. For example, possession of the power to
borrow on the policy only to pay the premiums 1 ' or the right to
elect a settlement option"0 2 have resulted in inclusion. In the case of
a policy held in trust, the insured's power to change beneficial
ownership of the policy or the time or manner of enjoyment thereof
is considered an incident of ownership, even though the insured has
no beneficial interest in the trust.'3  As in other possessory
373 (7th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir.
1956); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1952); Rhodes v. Commis-
sioner, 174 F.2d 584, 586 (3d Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Washer, 127 F.2d 446 (6th
Cir.) (42-1 USTC 10, 168), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 653 (1942); Helvering v. Reybine, 83
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1936); Goldstein's Est. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 677 (Ct. Cl.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955); Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F.
Supp. 375, 384-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952),
aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953); Godfrey v. Smyth, 87 F. Supp. 982 (N.D.
Cal. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1950); Estate of Collins v. Commis-
sioner, 25 T.C. 1026, 1033 (1956); Estate of Welliver v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 165, 168-69
(1947); Estate of Elizabeth A. Wilson, 1 51,247 P-H T.C. Memo 728-29 (1951); (power to
change or designate the beneficiaries, or change their respective shares of recovery);
Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853
(1970); Kearns v. United States, 399 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Liebmann v. Hasset, 148
F.2d 247, 249 (1st Cir. 1945); Ballard v. Helburn, 9 F. Supp. 812, 814 (W.D. Ky. 1933),
aff'd 85 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1936) (36-1 USTC 9250); (right to surrender the policy for
cash); Commissioner v. Noel's Est., 380 U.S. 678, 684 (1965); Helvering v. Reybine, 83
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1936); (right to assign the policy); Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d
60, 64 (5th Oir. 1968); Fried v. Granger, supra at 566-68; (right to pledge the policy as
collateral for a loan); Ballard v. Helburn, supra; Samson v. United States, 1 F. Supp. 95
(D. Mass. 1932); (right to borrow against the surrender value of the policy); Landorf v.
United States, 408 F.2d 467, 461-69 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate of Selznick v. Commissioner,
15 T.C. 716 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952); (right to cancel the
policy).
100. Cf. Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 245-46 (5th Cir.
1958).
101. Estate of Bryan S. McCoy, 61,039 P-H T.C. Memo. 243 (1961).
102. Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973).
103. Treas. Reg. § 20.2402-1(c)(4). But, retention of purely adminstrative powers
by the insured will not cause the trust corpus to be included in his estate. Old Colony
Trust v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
The application of the incidents of ownership test to policies held by the insured
in a fiduciary capacity presents a host of interesting problems outside the scope of this
note. For a good discussion of the topic, see Note, Federal Estate Tax: Application of
the Section 2042 Incidents of Ownership Concept to the Insured Fiduciary's Estate, 60
IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1327-64 (1975). See also Note, Estate Taxation of Life Insurance
Under § 2042: Recent Decisions Defining Incidents of Ownership, 33 WASH. & LEE
REV. 776 (1976).
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capacities, it is divestment of the incidents of ownership, not the ir-
revocability of the trust, that is necessary to produce estate tax ex-
cludability."0 ' The regulations also attribute incidents of ownership
to an insured if he is the sole or controlling stockholder of a corpora-
tion which owns a policy on his life, as long as the proceeds are
neither payable to the corporation nor to a third party for business
purposes."'
Courts prefer to examine the issue of inclusion in terms of the
Treasury's illustrative list of incidents of ownership,'"° and perhaps
that is why the Department has not fared well in taxing life in-
surance proceeds where the insured possessed somewhat more peri-
pheral powers under the policy on his life."0 7 For example, it has
been held that the mere receipt of policy dividends is not an inci-
dent of ownership."8 Also, in a case where the insured had ir-
revocably assigned away all of his incidents of ownership, and then
subsequently lent his signature to convert the policy from term in-
surance to modified whole life, the court held that the insured had
not exercised a new incident of ownership.'"M Finally, by way of ex-
ample, it has been held that ownership of 500/0 of a partnership by
the insured does not constitute an incident of ownership over
policies owned by the partnership entity."0
No Incidents of Ownership in Suvivors' Loss Coverage
Even though Michigan personal protection survivors' loss in-
surance represents a policy on the life of the insured, the benefits
therefrom should not be included in the insured's gross estate for
104. See Eliasberg, IRC Section 2042- The Estate Taxation of Life Insurance:
What is an Incident of Ownership?, 51 TAXES 91, 102-05, 109-12 (1973). See also Estate
of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 915 (1968), aff'd, 427 F.2d 80, 83-6 (6th Cir. 1970).
105. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1975). See Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp.
1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (69-1 USTC 12,610). See generally Gordon, Life Insurance as a
Planning Tool, 33 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 793 (1975 Part 1).
106. LOWNDES, KRAMER & MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 13.7 at
331 n.38 (3d ed. 1974).
107. Id. at 330-31.
108. See Keefe v. Broderick, 25 F. Supp. 957 (D.R.I. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 112 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. dismissed, 311 U.S. 721 (1940); Newcomb v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C. 958, rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d (2d Cir. 1960); Estate of
Bowers v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 911 (1955); Estate of Dorson v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
463 (1944).
109. LaMade v. Brownell, 245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1965). The insured's
signature was not necessary for the conversion to take place.
110. Estate of Knipp v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 827 (1957).
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federal estate tax purposes. A driver insured under the Michigan
no-fault law holds no rights in the survivors' loss portion of his total
policy that provide him with economic benefit. For example, the in-
sured has no power to designate or change beneficiaries under the
provision, or to change their respective shares of recovery. Instead,
the beneficiaries are designated by statute and the amount of
recovery, if any, is determined after the death of the insured.' The
statute expressly prohibits any attempt to assign the benefits."' The
insured builds no equity in his survivors' loss coverage and the
policy cannot be surrendered for cash. Also, as in the case of stand-
ard term insurance, survivors' loss benefits do not represent a
policy reserve against which the insured may draw a loan, or which
the insured may use as collateral for some other business transac-
tion. Finally, the insured has no power to alter the time of enjoy-
ment of the benefits.
Obviously, the no-fault insured retains the power to cancel his
survivors' loss coverage by cancelling his entire insurance policy.
However, that power to cancel should not be treated as an incident
of ownership for the purposes of § 2042. By definition an incident of
ownership must bring some economic benefit to the insured."' In
past cases the power to cancel a policy has been considered an inci-
dent of ownership when cancellation would provide the insured with
some form of cash return."' In contrast, cancellation of survivors'
loss insurance results in an economic detriment to the insured.
Without proper auto coverage the insured forfeits his right to drive
legally in Michigan."' Loss of that privilege is hardly an economic
benefit in today's mobile society.
Since the insured holds no economically beneficial power of con-
trol over the survivors' loss portion of his policy, it should be con-
cluded that he possesses no incidents of ownership in his survivors'
loss coverage. Accordingly, amounts receivable by the insured's
dependents as survivors' loss benefits should not be included in the
gross estate of the insured.
111. See notes 22 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
112. See note 21 supra
113.
It is clear that Congress intended the term "incidents of ownership" to
mean more than mere possession or ownership in the technical-legal
sense. Rather the test was intended to be-does the insured have the
right to the economic benefits of the policy, regardless of his rights to the
proceeds themselves?
Wilson, Equal Treatment for Life Insurance, 112 TRUSTS & ESTATES 270 (1973).
114. See, e.g., Estate of Selznick v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 716, 729 (1950).
115. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.2101 (Supp. 1977).
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CONCLUSION
Michigan survivors' loss benefits should be excluded from the
taxable gross estate of the insured for two reasons. First of all, the
benefits represent a portion of wrongful death recovery in Michigan,
and therefore are exempt from taxation under the holding in Con-
necticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States.1 '6 Secondly, the benefits
do not qualify as taxable life insurance proceeds under § 2042. The
insured holds no economically beneficial powers of control-"in-
cidents of ownership" - over the survivors' loss portion of his policy.
Therefore, according to the tax code, the benefits paid for survivors'
loss should not be included in the gross estate of the insured for
estate tax purposes.
If a tax break should arise in Michigan due to strict enforce-
ment of the incidents of ownership test, it is proper that the
benefits therefrom should inure to the taxpayers.1"' Only Congress
has the broad power to tax life insurance proceeds,118 and the IRS
may not legislate, through administrative tactics, so as to defy the
taxing criteria established by law."9 If correct application of the tax
laws to survivors' loss benefits causes a reduction in the total
revenues collected by the Treasury, it is the role of the Congress,
and not of the IRS, to make up the difference.
116. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
117. See Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 230 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
118. Id. Cf. Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
119. See Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 230 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
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